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Abstract
Physical layer security protocols have recently been deployed in the context of Wireless communi-
cations. These are derived from the intrinsic characteristics of the communication media for key
generation, sharing and randomness extraction. These protocols always seek to exhibit both low
computational complexity and energy efficiency, whilst also maintain unconditionally secure com-
munications. We present herein, a comprehensive literature review of existing “state-of-the-art"
quantisation schemes for physical layer security, with a strong emphasis upon key performance
metrics and intrinsic channel characteristics. Our survey seeks not only to concentrate upon the
most common quantisation methods, hence their efficiency during key generation; but also cru-
cially, describes the inherent trade-offs as between these standardised metrics. The exact way(s) in
which these metrics are duly influenced by quantisation schemes is also discussed, by means of a
comprehensive critical narrative of both existing and future developments in the field.
Keywords: key generation, physical layer security, quantisation, wireless channels
1. Introduction
The exponential growth of wireless communication systems, such as wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) and vehicle ad-hoc networks (VANETs), draws an increasing interest with regards to pri-
vacy and security due to the broadcasting nature of the wireless communication channel. This
security problem consists in the transmitter Alice which sends private messages to the legitimate5
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receiver Bob through an insecure channel, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve, whose aim
is to extract the original payload using her observations.
Securing a communication means putting the adversary in a disadvantageous position with
respect to the legitimate receiver. Such a situation is commonly obtained by the adoption of tradi-
tional cryptographic techniques to encode/decode communication content [1]. In these protocols,10
security is considered as an independent feature to the channel properties, built on the assumption
that an error-free physical layer has already been established.
In public key cryptography, a centralised trusted authority generates, distributes and maintains
key-pairs to communicators, which implies a high key-management complexity and intensive key
distribution to support the key establishment [2, 3]. This kind of approaches rely on computational15
complexity, however are not suitable for low-end wireless devices, as demonstrated in Diffie-Hellman
[4] and RSA algorithms. On the other hand, symmetric cryptography has the potential of achieving
high security and low overhead, but its application scenarios are severely reduced by the complex
task of generating and distributing shared secret keys. Surprisingly, wireless channels provide
a unique source of randomness that may be harvested for such a task. The wireless signal is20
often subject to mechanisms such as scattering, reflection and diffraction that create multipath
propagation components as shown in Fig. 1. Changes in the transmitter and receiver’s positions
and velocity of intermediate objects greatly influence the resulting signal, due due to constructive
and destructive interference of multipath components. This fading phenomena can be viewed as an
unpredictable carrier modulation driven by the channel intrinsic physical properties, which vary in25
different domains, as in time, distance and frequency [5].
Although multipath variability is considered as a stochastic process, it should affect similarly
both legitimate parties due to reciprocity [6]. Meanwhile communication links between two parties
exhibit unique channel response characteristics which become rapidly uncorrelated in both space
and time [7]. The conjunction of these two factors, namely channel reciprocity and time-spatial30
decorrelation, permits the extraction of shared secret keys and lays the foundations for every physical
layer security (PLS) approach introduced in references [8–11]. Different perspectives regarding
various PLS approaches are present in current literature [12–15]. Reference [12] identifies two
families of protocols, specifically based on the received signal strength (RSS) and on the channel
impulse response (CIR). Furthermore, it introduces innovative schemes based on the fluctuation35
of the bit error rate (BER) [16], reverse pilot signalling [17], random channel hopping [18] and
2
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Figure 1: Multipath Signal Propagation [5]
reactive jamming [19]. Reference [13] on the other hand classifies works based on their quantisation
method, their reconciliation and privacy amplification approaches together with the evaluation of
the corresponding feasibility and security. In the survey [14] PLS algorithms are overviewed with a
specific focus on the security threats of wireless communications at different levels of Open Systems40
Interconnection (OSI) model and on how they can act as both vulnerabilities and opportunities to
improve secrecy rate, for example through beam-forming and the injection of artificial noise. Lastly,
reference [15] provides a complete introduction to relevant challenges and solutions in both keyless
security and physical layer key generation, to approaches targeting multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) systems and the issues related to the partial knowledge of channel state information (CSI).45
This paper focuses on quantisation techniques as major part of secret key establishment in
physical layer security depends on the conversion of channel estimates into bit-streams, inheriting
its performances and its degree of immunity against noise and imperfect reciprocity. Unlike the
aforementioned surveys, the taxonomy of PLS approaches is illustrated in Fig. 2, where schemes are
categorised based either on their ability to influence their contexts to increase the secrecy capacity50
(active harvesting) or on their passivity to rely on the existing channel conditions (passive harvest-
ing), both of which depend on the specific characteristics they choose to quantise. Passive protocols
outnumber the counter-part as they do not require special hardware, consequently promising lower
implementation costs and ready-for-use solutions in current wireless networks. However, the grow-
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ing demand for higher data rates pushes the adoption of multi-antennas equipped devices, fuelling55
the research on active techniques based on directional modulation (DM), beam-forming and the
injection of artificial noise.
Another proposed contribution is presented in Fig. 3 where protocols are clustered according
to the actual evaluation metrics they aim to improve. Red, blue and green boxes indicate the
corresponding channel properties used by algorithms, frequency-phase, received signal strength and60
channel impulse response, respectively. Miscellaneous methods are excluded. Table 1 shows in more
depth which part of the scheme’s novelty is correlated to each key performance metric. Interestingly,
the major part of protocols aims to improve the bit generation rate in order to extract keys in less
time and with fewer samples. However, an inadequate bit error rate may disrupt the entire key
establishment since a single uncorrectable different bit enforces the restart of the entire generation65
process. Furthermore, only a few schemes are interested in maximising the key entropy to cope
with the poorly available randomness in low-mobility scenarios which greatly affects the overall
algorithm robustness.
The rest of the work is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the concepts and the fundamen-
tal aspects of the key generation process and associated performance metrics. A brief introduction70
of different types of attacks and the most prominent adversarial models is also provided. Section 3
critically presents the quantisation steps focusing on different channel characteristics based on an
extensive literature review of various techniques in the public domain. Finally, section 4 draws the
conclusions of the literature research.
4
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of physical layer security approaches based on nodes’ harvesting abilities and the corresponding
quantisation characteristics.
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Figure 3: Taxonomy of physical layer security protocols according to their improved performance metrics. Red, blue
and green boxes indicate frequency-phase, received signal strength and channel impulse response based protocols,
respectively.
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2. Key generation fundamentals
According to Shannon [76], unconditionally secure communications can be obtained if the eaves-
dropper’s observations do not provide any useful information regarding the message, without im-
posing any limits on processing power and time. This condition, referred to as perfect secrecy, is
equivalent to a zero mutual information between the message and the key which, in turns, must have80
an impractical length, of at least the length of the message, as in the one-time pad implementation
[77]. Shannon’s considerations stem from the scenario in which all receivers sense identical copies
of the transmitted signal, which may not be the generic case.
Wyner in his work [8] assumed that Eve has access to a degraded version of the legitimate
channel and he proved that secure communications are possible in the absence of a secret key,85
under a weaker condition of secrecy. In reference [78] these results were extended to the Gaussian
wiretap channel and the secrecy capacity CS was defined as the maximum achievable secrecy rate
RS = I(W ;B)−I(W ;E) where I(W ;B), I(W ;E) are the amount of information that Bob and Eve
obtain from the message W , respectively. That is, the secrecy capacity is the difference between
the main channel capacity CB and that of the eavesdropper’s link CE , thus CS = CB − CE .90
Nonetheless, many techniques have been introduced to improve the secrecy capacity of a channel,
as the use of multi-antenna systems to generate artificial noise and beam-forming. For an overview
of such methods, readers can refer to [14, Section V].
Keyless security is based on the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel state information
which hardly holds in real-world scenarios, limiting this way its practical implementations. This95
constraint was relaxed by Maurer [10] and Ahlswede-Csiszar [79], who explored a new environment
where Eve observes a higher quality channel in comparison to the one available for the legitimate
parties, introducing a strategy for secure transmission. Maurer’s idea was based on the development
of a shared secret key by both Alice and Bob, over a public and insecure channel.
2.1. Channel reciprocity and diversity100
In addition to the background noise, the wireless medium is also subject to various effects which
unpredictably modify the received signal and can be subdivided in three categories: path-loss,
shadowing and multipath. Path-loss is the attenuation of the transmitted power due to distance
and other propagation-related characteristics of the channel. Shadowing is also known as large scale
fading and it represents the alteration of signal power caused by objects and obstacles between the105
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communicators. Finally, multipath or small scale fading refers to the combination of time-delayed
and phase-shifted signal echoes, producing fades (nulls) and distortions [80].
The frequency-variant channel response can be written as
G(f, t) =
L∑
l=1
|al|exp(jφl)exp(j2πvlt)exp(−j2πfτl)
where L is the number of multipath components, {|al|exp(jφl)} their complex amplitudes with
random phases {φl}. Doppler frequencies {vl} take into account the mobility of the transmitter,
the receiver and scatterers while the delays {τl} are the consequence of the different paths travelled110
by the different replicas of the transmitted signal [81]. Small scale fading can be limited to specific
sub-regions, namely restricted time interval (RTI) and restricted bandwidth ( BW), where all
the previous set of parameters {|al|}, {vl}, {τl} are constant and the channel is considered wide-
sense stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS), leaving outside large yet slow variations such
as shadowing. Moreover, there are smaller regions, referred to as coherence regions, in which the115
channel response is approximately constant due to the doubly underspread (DU) property that
practical wireless channels possess [81, Fig 2.].
In these coherence regions two legitimate nodes can extract, in an interleaved fashion, a num-
ber of estimates from a common random source unavailable to Eve. At any given time-index the
corresponding pair of measurements is highly statistically correlated according to the above reci-120
procity [6]. However, in real-life scenarios reciprocity is imperfect due to the asymmetries at the
channel ends, interferences, phase offsets, oscillators’ frequency drifts and mainly the half-duplex
nature of commercial transceivers that are not able to transmit and receive simultaneously [82].
For simplicity, we refer to all these obstacles as noise whose influence requires the presence of the
information reconciliation step, taken from quantum cryptography, which aims to correct such dis-125
crepancies through communication over the public channel to which the eavesdropper can freely
listen [9, 10, 83].
Equally important are the variations of the channel characteristics defined as functions of the
channel coherence region in the chosen metrics’ domains, i.e. coherence time, coherence bandwidth
and coherence length [84]. Frequency selectivity is a consequence of the irregular spectrum gen-130
erated by multipath time-dispersion due to the different paths travelled by waves, each with its
own delay. On the other hand, space-time variability is connected to multipath directions which
constructively/destructively alters the resulting signal even with small movements of the receiver
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[7].
The simultaneous presence of highly correlated behaviours inside the coherence region and the135
unpredictable diversity outside it gives birth to a difference of mutual information between legitimate
parties and adversaries, which is considered as a shared source of randomness successfully harvested
for the extraction of a symmetric key. Frequency diversity is explored in reference [44] and improved
by [45, 48, 49, 52, 85], while the spatial domain is investigated in references [57, 86–90].
In all these approaches, the quantisation stage plays an important role in extracting the wireless140
channel information needed in consecutive steps for the secret key establishment. The challenging
aspects of the quantisation process are mainly attributed to the contrasting relationship between
the rate of generated bits, their entropy and robustness and their correlation at both communication
ends, which is trivially related neither to the specific choice of the channel characteristics nor to
the scheme’s parameters [22, 91].145
2.2. Evaluation metrics
In order to compare and contrast different key generation protocols, it is necessary to introduce
the corresponding performance metrics. These are: 1) the randomness or the entropy of the key,
2) the bit mismatch rate (BMR) and 3) the bit generation rate (BGR) [23]. In certain studies,
both BGR and BMR are leveraged in order to obtain the key generation rate (KGR) and the
key disagreement rate (KDR) [64, 92]. Similar to any conventional cryptographic method, in PLS
algorithms the key must not have any statistical defects in order to maximise the uncertainty from
Eve’s point of view. Given a key of length N , the associated entropy is defined as:
H = −p0log2p0 − (1− p0)log2(1− p0)
where p0 is the posterior probability of bits being zero from Eve’s knowledge [93]. Therefore, the key
must expose properties that a truly random sequence would probably exhibit as expressed in refer-
ence [1]. Fifteen tests are provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[94] which verify different aspects, such as the frequency of symbols’ occurrences, the presence of150
long runs and other periodic features. The bit mismatch rate is an evaluation metric strictly linked
to the quantisation step and its parameters and it is defined as the ratio of mismatch bits to the
total number of generated bits [23]. Low levels of BMR confirm the resilience of the quantisation
scheme against the noise and the asymmetric differences of the channel. In contrast, high BMRs
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Figure 4: The secret key extraction process
could greatly influence the overall performance of the systems since a single uncorrectable bit may155
force the reject of the entire sequence and the restart of the full process.
The bit generation rate is defined as the number of secret bits generated per unit time or
per sample [23] which depends on both protocols’ properties and on environmental characteristics,
such as nodes’ movements and multipath richness. Higher values of BGR indicate the faster
ability of two nodes of establishing a key of the desired length. This metric acts as a global160
performance indicator by incorporating all contrasting aspects of the secret generation process. In
fact, the distillation stage aims to increase its throughput by harvesting increasingly detailed channel
characteristics, whilst the information reconciliation and privacy amplification phases unavoidably
decrease it by dropping erroneous and predictable bits, respectively.
2.3. The secret key generation process165
For the sake of simplicity, the process of secret key generation can be divided in three funda-
mental tasks (see Fig. 4): the first one, called advantage distillation [10, 95] focuses on extracting
information available only to the legitimate parties. This initiates with a channel probing task, also
referred to as beacon exchange, which consists of the interleaved exchange of probes by Alice and
Bob in the process of gathering their corresponding estimates. Mathematically, the measurements170
are defined as follows:
ĤA(tA) = h(tA) + w(tA)
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ĤB(tB) = h(tB) + w(tB)
where h(t) is the reciprocal channel response, w(t) the additive white Gaussian noise and ĤX(t)
the noisy estimates. The duration of the probing phase is proportional to the desired key length,
whilst the probing frequency depends on the dynamic properties of the channel. In fact, in order to
sense correlated estimates both Alice and Bob must collect their measurements inside the coherence175
time Tc of the channel that represents the time duration over which the channel impulse response
is considered as static.
In wireless medium the coherence time is strictly connected to Doppler effects due to nodes’
movements [96]. Specifically, the coherence interval Tc = 1/fmax is the time domain dual of the
maximum Doppler frequency fmax = fTmax+fRmax+fSmax where the latter includes the frequency180
contributions of the transmitter fTmax, the receiver fRmax and the mobile scatterers fSmax [81]. A
fast probing rate will easily result in redundant estimates which are not suitable in the generation
of a key and must be re-sampled in order to extract a distinct measurement for each coherence
time. In rare cases probing could be done continuously, for example by injecting an initial random
phase as in reference [46].185
The majority of the protocols use a fixed probing rate which does not adapt to dynamically
changing channels, limiting their capacity to exploit any added randomness or in some cases extract
useless correlated estimates. In reference [60] the relationship between the percentage of coherence
time and the randomness of the key is investigated and authors claim that the most widely used
sample interval of 50% of the coherence time is not sufficient to guarantee enough statistical ro-190
bustness of the key. An indirect approach, proposed in reference [64], assesses the probing rate
by evaluating entropy, through the Lempel and Ziv complexities associated to the finite-time size
sequences, in order to drive a proportional integral derivative (PID) controller which dynamically
tunes the frequency.
Channel estimates are then converted into binary strings in a successive quantisation step which195
holds a primary role in the entire bit extraction process, thus greatly influencing the overall per-
formance of the system. The output at this point has the potential to become the shared secret
key after passing through further steps. For this reason, every quantisation scheme is evaluated
against two contrasting metrics, as in the bit generation rate and the bit mismatch rate, in an effort
to maximise the former and minimise the latter. Although simple and easy to implement, the use200
of uniform quantisation [97] is to be avoided because BMR rapidly increases with the number of
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quantisation intervals [56].
The number of thresholds constitutes another useful classification. In fact, even if quantisation
itself does intrinsically reduce the amount of information, a lossy or censor scheme drops values
that fall in specific invalid regions in its effort to minimise disagreement probability. On the other205
hand, lossless schemes convert every estimate with single or multi-thresholds (see Fig. 5 and 6).
Time
R
S
S
I
RSSI envelope
Estimates
Threshold
Figure 5: An example of RSS-based lossless quantisa-
tion: every channels estimate is used through the com-
paring with a unique threshold.
Time
R
S
S
I
RSSI envelope
Valid estimate
Dropped estimate
Lower threshold
Upper threshold
Figure 6: An example of RSS-based lossy / censor
quantisation: channels estimates between thresholds are
dropped to reduce the bit disagreement rate.
After quantisation, bit-streams pass through an information reconciliation block which has the
role of correcting any bit disagreement. Its implementation varies from error correction codes to
fuzzy techniques. The majority of protocols uses an algorithm called CASCADE [83] in which
Alice randomly permutes the bit sequence and exchanges with Bob the parity check information.210
Bob, on the other hand, permutes his bits in the same way and checks his parity trying to correct
any potential discrepancies. This process can be iterated to increase the probability of success.
At a later time, researchers proposed new techniques with better reconciliation capabilities, while
minimising the potential information leakage to an adversary [56, 71].
At this point, Alice and Bob’s bit-streams should be identical otherwise the key generation215
process restarts. However, these sequences are not yet ready to be used as a key. Before that,
it is necessary that vectors do not reveal any of the information used in their creation. In fact,
information reconciliation through public discussion reveals useful information on eavesdropper
Eve, weakening the protocol robustness. The step of privacy amplification aims to increase key
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entropy, for example by applying a universal hash function which maps n bits to sequences of220
lesser length k < n of which Eve does not have any details [98]. In other protocols, privacy
amplification is obtained by XORing the sequences generated from different sources, as in the case
of different antennas in a MIMO system [34]. The role of privacy amplification is what makes
lossy/lossless classification even more interesting. Lossy schemes sacrifice a high generation rate
to remove statistic defects from the bit-streams, which are directly used as a secret key without225
the need for privacy amplification. Applications of this approach are in references [20, 22, 71]. In
contrast, lossless schemes produce a higher bit extraction rate but rely on privacy amplification to
increase the entropy of the resulting sequence.
2.4. Feasibility of physical layer security approaches
Deployment costs and resilience against attacks are important factors to bear in mind while230
evaluating the feasibility of security infrastructures, especially when the size and the topology of the
network are continuously changing. In contrast to conventional cryptography, PLS-based methods
do not require additional hardware as the keys are extrapolated from the channel itself, whilst
conventional approaches usually require additional hardware in order to contain and protect all the
keys to be used in future communications. On the other hand, PLS schemes have to continuously235
evaluate channel properties, introducing a conspicuous operational cost. In reference [99] authors
argued that the latter possibly annihilates the interest for adoption by the industry but they do not
seem to consider the computation and network overhead caused by public key algorithms during
the signature verification.
Attacks against PLS can be categorised into either active or passive. Passive attacks are consid-240
ered by all proposed schemes which consist in the ability of Eve to fully listen to the communication
between Alice and Bob at the same instant it takes place. Robustness against passive attacks is a
direct consequence of the wireless space-time variability, which renders adversary’s estimates un-
correlated from the corresponding ones sensed in the main channel. This crucial point is further
investigated in reference [100] where the diametrically opposed scenario in which Eve has full knowl-245
edge of the context (for example, the position and the mobility of every object) it is considered
and equations have been derived to compute the channel impulse response as Alice or Bob would
observe it. Despite this interesting, different point of view, the initial assumption is too strong and
utopian in real-world scenarios.
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On the other hand, active adversaries have the ability to interfere and modify the communica-250
tion context. In reference [101] the adversary, Mallory, exploits the superposition characteristic of
the wireless medium, by injecting malicious packets and then destroying the legitimate ones with
jamming techniques [102].
Let rba be the response of the channel during a transmission from Bob to Alice which coincides
with rab not considering non-reciprocity factors. In addition, let r
a
m, r
b
m be the responses of signals255
received by Mallory from Alice or Bob, thus implying ram ≈ rma and rbm ≈ rmb . The key idea is that
even if the adversary does not know how exactly probes are received by the legitimate parties, he
does know that their differential d = |ram− rbm| will be preserved. In the case that Mallory detects
a high differential, this constitutes an excellent opportunity to inject estimates for Alice and Bob by
sending a signal of maximum magnitude to the node with the highest RSSI and a minimal powered260
packet to the other end, forcing them to disagree, thus sabotaging their generation process. To
be more precise, disagreement on more bits may be needed to disrupt the entire process, but this
number must be kept to a minimum, in order not to be detected by statistic countermeasures. On
the other hand, a low differential means that injected packets cause a similar channel response to
Alice and Bob, presenting an opportunity to generate the same bits through their corresponding265
quantisation steps. When Mallory detects such a condition, he saves the received RSS value and
then sends spoofed probes to both Alice and Bob. According to the small differential, ideally zero,
Alice and Bob may choose this injected excursion to generate bits, thus letting the adversary to
recover part of the key after estimating quantisation levels by scenario-based guessing or better by
a specific setup phase.270
To protect the previous schemes from such an attack, reference [30] proposes an improvement
consisting of RSS values not directly used as quantisation inputs but replaced with relative differ-
ences. In the first step, Alice and Bob collect estimates at their maximum probing rate, split them
into segments and then remove slow fluctuations, which dominate the channel variations in static
environments by subtracting a moving average. In every segment the first estimate is used as a275
single threshold to emit bits according to the sign of delta values. Comparing to [22], the use of
relative differences makes this scheme immune to attacks as described in reference [23] because of
its ability to generate high entropy bits, even if RSS values are globally very low. Moreover, the
extraction rate records an increase of 200% mainly because an agreement between parties does not
require the presence of contiguous excursions.280
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A formal model of the adversary has been proposed in reference [103] based on the probability
of knowing any of the estimates. This probability is considered as part of the privacy amplification
to include the information leaked during both quantisation and information reconciliation stages.
Assuming that the probability is unknown to legitimate parties, authors claim that entropy
estimation of the key is irrelevant, if it is done from Alice or Bob’s points of view. In fact, Alice285
or Bob may consider random a sequence which has zero entropy for Eve. Protocol designs should
use the entropy estimation according to the adversary, proven to be very complex. The authors
assert that the generation of secret shared keys could be viewed as the synchronisation of two
pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) at legitimate nodes. Following this similarity, they
expect that the existing knowledge about PRNG will strengthen the robustness of wireless security290
approaches. In their study, they propose to divide the extraction phase into two parts, referred to
as Entropy Harvesting and Entropy Management. The former has the objective to continuously
gather estimates from the channel and to collect them even if the key does not have to be generated.
Entropy Management will peek from that poll to feed a robust PRNG which maintains the state
and generates the keys as needed.295
In the majority of schemes in literature, there is also the assumption of the presence of an
authenticated channel which implies that the identities of Alice and Bob have already been verified
prior to the information reconciliation step. Nevertheless, this assumption is unrealistic because
authentication requires the exchange of a security key which is the result of the successive steps.
However, only in a few studies these issues are addressed. In reference [22] Eve tries to masquerade300
Alice’s role by sending a sequence of indices to Bob. Following from the uncorrelated behaviour
caused by distance, these indices are likely to contain invalid positions that can be detected by
statistic countermeasures, i.e. by using a correlation threshold.
3. Channel characteristics and quantisation schemes
Physical layer security is linked to the channel characteristics which are used as sources of ran-305
domness for secret keys generation. In contrast to traditional security, where the channel is assumed
to be ideal and error-free, here the imperfection and variability of its characteristics are essential
to extract high entropy keys [104]. As pointed out in [105], many of the following approaches rely
on a single source of randomness, usually the carrier magnitude and a binary quantisation space
made up of thresholds which are applied on absolute or differential estimates. However, channel310
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characteristics are not mutually exclusive allowing the simultaneous estimations of multiple sources
to raise the bit extraction rate, as in [45] where both channel gain and phase are collected. In these
cases an additional step, namely Fusion Operation [106], needs to be placed right before the quan-
tisation step, working on physical estimates, or located after it, merging the resulting bit-streams.
Noteworthy, the statistical independence of estimates from different sources does not imply the315
non-correlation of corresponding errors and errors’ bounds; for example, as argued in [105], the
phase highly fluctuates at low amplitudes, while the reverse is also true. This suggests that the
design of quantisation space is neither homogeneous nor uniform, hence needs to be adapted to
context specific behaviours, empirically determined.
Received signal strength, channel impulse response and frequency-phase are the most popular320
channel parameters used in estimates. More specifically, received signal strength indicator (RSSI)
is by far the most used approach because its value is available in all out-of-the-shelf transceivers on
a frame basis hence, dramatically reducing design and implementation costs. Frequency-phase and
CIR-based approaches are more resilient to attacks, as well as being able to generate long secret keys
depending on the uniformly distributed nature of the former, as well as to the CSI details given by325
the latter. In work [65], the exploitation of the angle of arrival (AoA) manifests good performances
at very low signal to noise levels, whereas other characteristics tend to be weak. However, these
techniques involve both computational and hardware complexities which may not be sustainable in
common scenarios (see Table 2).
3.1. RSS based methods330
In their work [20], Tope et al. introduced a protocol based on the evaluation of signal attenuation
caused by multipath channels extracted from the envelope of received packets. Channel estimates
are not directly quantised but instead, arrays of variations are generated by subtracting half values
from the other half, in order to remove the predictable slowly changing component due to path-loss,
which is correlated to the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. Two fixed thresholds335
drop the lowest and highest values, to reduce the probability of disagreement and to improve key
robustness, respectively. The proposed scheme does not take imperfect reciprocity into account,
stating that the correlation between estimates could always be increased by choosing a sufficient fast
probing rate. Furthermore, low-mobility or static scenarios produce negligible envelope variations,
which are likely filtered out by the low threshold, resulting in a reduced global performance.340
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Table 2: Comparison of common sources of randomness
Attribute Complexity Resilience Cons Pros
RSS Low Low Extraction rate and key en-
tropy depend on mobility
Reduced implementation
and deployment costs
Freq-Phase High High Require specific hardware
and subject to synchronisa-
tion issues
Robust in both static and
dynamic environments; us-
able in group key generation
CIR Medium High Suffers from imperfect reci-
procity and require advances
channel estimation methods
More detailed CSI hence
higher generation rate even
in static scenarios
AoA High Medium Hard to estimate Good performance even at
low SNR
Even if thresholds decrease mismatch probability, as well as the predictability of the generated
bits, they drop all the same values outside permitted ranges. Therefore, they fail to exploit esti-
mates that may potentially improve the bit extraction rate. This fact suggests that quantisation
performances are strictly dependent on the choice of the physical characteristics of the channel
used for estimates and the specific selection of parameters (thresholds), which are often made only345
through empirical evaluations, hence not necessarily optimal.
An automatic thresholds method has been proposed in [21] where the lossless scheme is based
on the detection of deep fades that are local minima of the signal, considered to be less subjective
to disagreement. In this approach, bit-streams are generated by comparing the estimates with a
single threshold, set by an automatic gain control circuit (AGC), rendering it independent from350
the variability of signal power and its attenuation. Deep fades are represented by sub-sequences of
a sufficient number of 1-bits, referred to as runs. Possible disagreements between Alice and Bob’s
fade locations are only imputable to bits shifts and differences situated either at the beginning
or at the end of a run. This fact, together with the knowledge of the deep-fades rate, deriving
from the channel statistics and the Rayleigh model, shrinks the search space which can be explored355
by Bob to find the vector that generated the hash received from Alice, thus extracting the secret
key. Information reconciliation is provided by a fuzzy reconciliation technique which simultaneously
corrects the disagreements and enhances randomness of the streams.
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Due to the use of deep fades, previous scheme is less susceptible to noise and interference, but the
overall entropy of the key still depends on the movements of nodes involved in the communication.360
That strongly dictates the artificial creation of interference to introduce the necessary variability to
extract a secret key. Unfortunately, evaluation is limited to simulation and theoretical analysis, not
revealing the relationship between the key generation rate and the choice of system parameters.
Inspired by the previous scheme, the protocol proposed in [22] provides authentication and
gives a detailed analysis of the relationship between the choice of quantisation parameters and the
resulting performance. A windowed average is subtracted to remove shadow fading (or large scale
fading) effects which introduce slow, yet substantial alterations to the signal power. Quantiser is
based on two thresholds calculated using average µ and standard deviations σ computed on arrays
of estimates ĥ
q± = µ(ĥ)± α · σ(ĥ)
and a quantisation function Q(·) defined as
Q(x) =



1, if x > q+
0, if x < q−
dropped otherwise
In this protocol, as well as in all level crossing schemes, the key robustness is best achieved in
Rician and Rayleigh fading models because of their symmetry around the distribution means, hence365
an equal probability of having positive and negative excursions. Quantisation parameters are chosen
starting from the desired probability of key disagreement, which in turns depends on the probability
for which the two sequences disagree on a single bit. A more prudent choice of parameters leads to a
reduction of the key generation rate, which in turns, is limited by the level-crossing rate in Rayleigh
model in the order of maximum Doppler frequency [96]. In other words, one cannot indefinitely keep370
on increasing the probing rate to raise the secret key generation rate because the latter saturates
at the maximum Doppler frequency. Nonetheless, if we increase the latter while keeping a fixed
probing rate, the key generation rate will again decrease. These behaviours indicate that probing
rate and other system parameters have to be chosen according to the dynamic characteristics of the
channel itself. To further reduce BMR, the scheme quantises estimates only if they are contained375
in a sequence of m excursions above or below the corresponding thresholds, with m a fixed system
parameter.
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This constraint has been removed in reference [39], obtaining a slightly higher generation rate
at the costs of an increased bit mismatch rate. Nonetheless, in [38] the application of turbo codes
efficiently maintains a low BMR during the analysis of a standard quantisation scheme in vehicle-380
to-vehicle scenarios with three-dimensional scattering and scatterers’ mobility. Previous approaches
are based on fixed thresholds and they have failed to achieve fast key generation rate with high
entropy because of their susceptibility to static environments [20, 21] and the sacrifice of some bits
in return for a stronger robustness [22].
Inspired by [22], the scheme introduced by authors in [23], namely Adaptive Secret Bit Gen-385
eration (ASBG), dynamically calculates its quantisation thresholds in every block (of configurable
size) of channel estimates. Furthermore, instead of asking for continuous excursions of sufficient
length, here the quantisation is applied at each measurement, delegating to the privacy amplifi-
cation step the task of removing bit correlations. To compensate for this information loss, ASBG
tries to extract more bits from a single estimate, dividing the entire R S interval in noise-limited390
number n ∼ 4 of levels. As disagrements usually involve adjacent quantisation bins, Gray codes
[107] are preferred to increase the probability of resolving such mismatches within the reconciliation
step based on CASCADE [83]. The authors elaborated further their analysis in reference [32] where
they explored the key generation possibilities offered by multiple-input multiple-output contexts,
with the concurrent introduction of an iterative distillation step which eliminates measurements395
that are likely to disagree between the parties. They also analysed the performance of different
schemes in real-world scenarios which gave the opportunity to summarise the pros and cons of
RSS-based approaches. The specific threat model includes an adversary able to control part of
the environment to render the estimates more predictable, as in the case of moving intermediate
objects.400
In [24], over-quantisation is used to improve a reconciliation step based on a low-density parity
check code (LDPC) fed by log-likelihood ratio estimates. In fact, even if over-quantised bits are
independent of the regular ones when an equiprobable quantisation is applied, both of them statisti-
cally depend on Bob’s estimates. This increased amount of mutual information reduces the required
number of bits in the syndrome needed by Bob, rising the secret key rate. A similar reconciliation405
approach is also used in [51] in a phase-based scheme.
A more sophisticated adaptable threshold has been proposed in [28]. In this scheme, each
transceiver creates a least-square polynomial curve whose degree is chosen according to estimates’
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length and the Doppler shift. This curve serves as a unique threshold for quantisation, which is
able to detect fades of smaller depths in contrast to the constant thresholding method. Simulations410
demonstrate that a high level crossing rate (LCR) is achievable with a relatively low degree of the
polynomial, in both Rician and Rayleigh fading models. Agreement rates are also improved via a
neural networks-based reconciliation, which authors plan to also use in the field of authentication
and user verification.
A neglected possibility of previous schemes is the mitigation of imperfect reciprocity, commonly415
considered as a consequence of uncontrollable and unpredictable noisy factors, mostly the non-
simultaneous directional measurements. In this attempt, in reference [25] a framework referred to
as High Uncorrelated Bit Extraction (HRUBE) was introduced composed of three parts: inter-
polation, decorrelation and adaptive multi-bit quantisation. In the first step, a technique called
Fractional Interpolation, consisting in the application of cubic Farrow filter to interpolate the chan-420
nel measurements, moves the latter as if they have been made at the same time instant. In the
following step, a Karhunen-Loéve transform (KLT) decorrelates vectors’ components, which are
then converted into bits in an Multi-bit Adaptive Quantisation (MAQ) scheme.
The absence of guard intervals encourages the design of a dynamic technique, to obtain a low
error rate when measurements are close to the threshold, where it is likely that the other part has425
already exceeded it. In MAQ, at any time the leader node has two quantisation variants at its
disposal, to choose one with the least probability of generating a mismatch. Even if the latter still
happens, the usage of Gray codes limits such a disagreement in only one bit. The lack of guard
intervals or invalid regions allows HRUBE to achieve a high key generation rate of 10 bits/sec with
a 0.54% bit mismatch rate and even better results of 22 bits/sec with a higher disagreement rate430
2.2%. Unfortunately, after the application of KLT, estimates can still be dependent on high-order
cross moments which implies that an adversary may be able to exploit this statistical defect and
predict specific values, a possibility that requires further research.
In reference [29] the Adaptive Ranking-based Uncorrelated Bit Extraction (ARUBE) protocol
has been introduced as an improvement over HRUBE with the aim to remove any non-reciprocity435
factors due to different hardware characteristics. The ranking method has a dual purpose: firstly,
it makes the process less related to the specific fading distribution and secondly, it normalises the
scales of different RSS-circuitries and various levels of signal powers. The added robustness also
brings an increment of 30%-60% bits per sample, in contrast to the previous protocol, reaching a
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total of 40 bits/sec with a low disagreement probability.440
Another scheme leveraging Farrow filter to address imperfect reciprocity is presented in reference
[31] where the problem of the collective extraction of a random key from a group of nodes is
analysed. Clearly, real RSS values must not be transmitted during the key agreement phase and
moreover, individual members of the group could be outside the communication range of others.
Consequently, authors designed a relying technique to assist the key generation, introducing a new445
metric, named Difference Of Signal Strength (DOSS), which is the difference among RSS indicators
measured at one node via different radio channels. Sharing this metric will not introduce security
weaknesses because an adversary may not recover the exact RSS estimates. The idea underlying
this scheme is that all members use the RSS values between two randomly chosen nodes as the
shared source of randomness to extract the common key. Even if they do not know these values by450
direct estimate, they know that differentials (i.e. DOSS values) will be preserved and shared during
the communication, which somewhat sends back the technique to the base of man-in-the-middle
attack [101].
According to the consideration that RSS measurements are more likely to agree on positive or
negative trends instead of absolute values, the scheme chooses to quantise fading trends to reduce455
the high bit mismatch rate associated to any multi-levels approaches, an idea at middle distance
between a standard approach and a full differential one as proposed in reference [30]. After a first
step of time interpolation to address non-simultaneous probes, estimates are browsed in the search
for continuous variations with the same polarity, i.e. trends, which are immediately quantised.
Values outside these monotone sequences are not dropped but quantised by a standard multi-460
level approach as proposed in reference [25]. Similarly to the latter, an increase of the number of
quantisation levels still leads to a corresponding increase in BMR, however, this drawback is limited
by the high number of measurements exhibiting fading trends.
Instead of transmitting RSS differential values, reference [36] proposes a way to secure the
distribution of keys among nodes. Starting from the simplest scenario, three nodes generate pairwise465
keys K1,2,K2,3,K3,1 using a standard one-to-one training process. After that, each node splits the
keys it possesses into two independent segments and sends their composition to the other nodes.
For example, node 1 possesses the split keys K11,2K21,2,K13,1K23,1 and sends K11,2⊕K13,1. After a full
round-trip, all nodes can concatenate the three keys, obtaining the final group key. The scheme has
been extended to more complex network topologies, however, it seems not to be able to exploit all470
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the channels available among nodes.
To achieve this objective, reference [35] starts from the idea that groups of nodes can be treated
as virtual wireless devices with multiple antennas, as long as they are interconnected in a secure
and smooth fashion. Each group has its own representative which is the primary controller in
the process of adding a new legitimate node. The latter exchanges probes with the entire group,475
measuring the channels among it and all members. Simultaneously, group’s participants estimate
the channels to the new node and send their results to the controller, which is now able to exploit an
increased RSSI data density. The proposed collaborative scheme accumulates this data faster than
serial approaches with the added benefit of having the joining node with low energy consumption
since it can multicast its probes. However, the group (especially the representative) consumes480
more energy, a fact that can have a wide impact if it is composed of resource-constrained nodes.
Moreover, further analysis is needed to take into account possible active adversaries as the system
seems to be prone to jamming attacks or packet injections.
In [33] a curve-fitting method is proposed to reduce the number of discrepancies between the
legitimate parties. Spearman correlation coefficient is used to evaluate the statistical dependence485
of different tests, demonstrating that the correlation of whole trials is higher than the same metric
on smaller intervals, which suggests the presence of correlated primary patterns accompanying
with different small-scale rapid variations. The removal of the latter is done by the application of
smoothing/curve-fitting techniques, improving both mutual information and correlation. The work
explored curve-fitting based on Fourier series and a moving average but besides their difference in490
complexity, it is not clear how the choice affects the evaluation metric, especially when it comes to
the key entropy. In contrast to a standard censor scheme, the multi-level quantisations convert all
samples into bits and a high number of levels ∼ 16 are usable keeping the mismatch probability
under the capacity of the CASCADE algorithm.
According to the fact that wireless signal behaves independently in different antennas, nodes in a495
MIMO system are able to harvest more mutual information, thus improving the secrecy throughput.
Intuitively, MIMO systems can scan more sub-channels and they are more likely to find some of
better quality (i.e. more shared randomness) than the single-antenna ones, whose combination has
a higher agreement rate. In reference [34] tests revealed that the extraction rate is four times higher
than what is achievable in the single-antenna mode. The increased amount of secrecy capacity seems500
to highly depend on the specific couple of antennas considered and on the order in which each pair
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is probed. Unfortunately, this dependency and the design of a more elaborated protocol aiming to
adapt the quantisation scheme to high-randomness channels, remain open to further research.
In [26], different signals received by different antennas are measured and compared, generating
bits according to their relative variations. In other words, the current quantisation thresholds are505
replaced with the estimates coming from the other inputs. The simulation shows that the protocol
requires an signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio of 20 dB and additional techniques to achieve a sufficiently
low bit disagreement rate.
Providing for the lack of multiple antennas systems, wireless relays can be used to introduce
randomness in static scenarios, acting as shared additional antennas. In [37] an untrusted relay is510
connected to the legitimate parties through time-variant channels, for example due to its mobility.
The key generation process starts with Alice sending a randomly chosen variable to both Bob
and the relay, however, only Bob is able to determine the original variable since the reciprocal
channel is static. The relay then forwards the received signal to Bob which, in turns, extracts the
original signal and obtains the estimate of the channel connecting the relay, thus exploiting its515
randomness. Simulations show that the introduction of the relay allows the extraction of keys in
static environments, at the cost of an increased BMR.
The removal of large-scale fading is a widely used technique in RSS-based approaches because
slow fading is predictable and leads to low entropy bit-streams which limit the robustness of the
resulting secret key. Nonetheless, there are specific scenarios where these slow differentials are520
not only interesting but also optimal, considering the associated bit mismatch rate that results
much lower than the one related to the faster component. This is evident in reference [27] where
physical layer security is applied in body area networks composed by small sensors positioned on
the human body to record vital signals with the ability to transmit them to a base station for filing
and further analysis. RSS has been preferred to other characteristics, such as phase and channel525
impulse response, for its feasibility in limited energetic and computational power. In contrast to
the majority of approaches, slow fading has proven to be acceptable by contrasting the intrinsic
predictability and low entropy with down-sampling, hence lowering the rate of bit extraction. The
generation process includes a Savitzky Golay filter which isolates the slow variation and a standard
quantisation scheme similar to the one introduced in reference [22]. The main advantage of using530
large-scale fading is the possibility to avoid the information reconciliation step entirely or use a
simple one instead, such as a single parity bit for a small block length empirically extrapolated.
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However, the lack of authentication renders this approach very weak against active attacks, such
as jamming and packet injection, which are unfortunately not taken into account but left aside for
future work.535
3.2. Frequency-phase based methods
Received signal strength is an attractive channel characteristic because of the simplicity in its
use but as noted in the previous section, all RSS-based schemes suffer from poor performance in
static environments. Node movements (and the various objects between them) are necessary to
reduce coherence time by increasing the Doppler spread which in turn, gives the upper bound of540
the bit extraction rate for sufficiently uncorrelated estimates in the Rayleigh fading model [45].
Nonetheless, the reciprocity principle does not only hold for RSS, but it is also extended to the full
channel state information (CSI), expressed as a complex number representing the amplitude and
the phase-offset applied to the transmitted signals.
Channel phase has the fundamental advantage of being less predicable in contrast to RSS values545
which can be influenced by an adversary by manipulating (part of) the environment to introduce
interferences and to move intermediate objects. In fact, given a transmitted signal in the form
A(t)cos(2πfct+φ(t)), where A(t), φ(t) are the time-variant amplitude and phase and fc the carrier
frequency, the channel modifies it introducing time-variant attenuation H(t) and phase-offset θ(t).
The resulting signal H(t)A(t)ej(φ(t)+θ(t)) evidentiates the multiplicative nature of the amplitude550
which Eve can influence, however, it also shows the immunity of the phase, being additive and
cyclic on a 2π period.
A first attempt in using phase as a source of randomness was done in reference [40] where
authors proposed a strategy based on the differential phase of two identical sinusoids at different
frequencies and error correcting codes to reduce BMR. Phase differences are preferred to the direct555
quantisation of the absolute values because they reduce the non-reciprocity factor caused by the
internal local oscillators which are hardly synchronised with all nodes. Arbitrarily long keys could be
generated by iteratively repeating the process. Furthermore, the authors generalised their protocol
in reference [41] where the phase differentials are extracted from sinusoids, which are emitted at
orthogonal frequencies separated by at least the coherence bandwidth of the channel to ensure560
statistical independence.
A similar technique was adopted in [42] where the keys are synthesised through the quantisation
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of a number of degrees of freedom (DoF) which are obtained by splitting the frequency band into
independent coherence bandwidths. Inspired by the work in reference [40], the document introduced
a theoretical analysis of the probability of phase agreement as a function of both the signal-to-565
interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) and the number of quantisation intervals. Not surprisingly,
both the theory and the simulation agree on asking higher SINR to achieve sufficient agreement
probability with an increasing number of quantisation levels.
In [45], phase differentials and amplitudes are exploited as two statistically independent sources.
Probing is done at every fixed interval greater than the coherence interval, hence the bit generation570
rate is still limited to the channel temporal variations which can be increased by a factor of 3-
4 by moving the transceivers. Complex channel gain has also been exploited in [51] where a
one-bit quantisation is applied in both amplitude and phase. Log-likelihood ratios (LLR) feed a
LDPC decoder to compensate non-reciprocity factors which significantly influences BMR in lossless
protocols. Since these ratios are calculated as a function of the difference between Alice and575
Bob’s current measurements, they do not require any knowledge of channel statistics, hence they
don’t need time-consuming operations such as the variance estimation by taking advantage of the
symmetry of channel gain probability density function. LLR calculation itself is computationally
complex, however, experiments show that a faster approximation based on BPSK-LLR is a feasible
alternative in low SNR environments.580
In its try to further improve key generation rate beyond coherence time saturation, the work in
[46] injects random initial phases in each extraction round-trip, proposing a scheme which is also
scalable for groups of nodes. To avoid the complex partial exchange of estimates, typical in RSS-
based group key generation as in [31], this protocol uses the sums of phase offsets, taking advantage
of the fact that they are identical in each node after a clockwise and anti-clockwise round-trip585
done in the same coherence interval. The resulting phase is then converted into bit-streams by
multi-level quantisation. One of the most significant improvements in this scheme is the possibility
to do many round-trips inside the same coherence interval because the choice of random phases
provides for the lack of entropy in static environments as well. The ability to scale with a group
of nodes is also appealing, however, the number of members is limited by the bit error rate and590
the signal-noise ratio associated with the channel. On the other hand, this protocol assumes that
all nodes are synchronised, that is they share a standard time reference. In particular scenarios
this can be unrealistic, as the use of local and independent oscillators introduces unpredictable and
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unmanageable phase offsets. Moreover, the algorithm assumes the availability of an authenticated
channel, where the identity of the nodes has already been previously verified and therefore it is not595
threatened by man-in-the-middle attacks.
In the previous scheme, the quantisation scheme does not have any invalid region, hence it can
extract bits from each estimate. Nevertheless, estimates in regions’ boundaries can easily lead to
disagreement between communication parties and guard intervals are recommended to maintain a
low BMR, as proposed in [47]. Intuitively, larger boundary regions will lower the probability of600
mismatch, while they simultaneously decrease the bit extraction rate as more estimates are likely
to be dropped. Consequently, the error probability is expressed as the condition in which two
correlated estimates are situated in different quantisation regions, depending on the tap-to-noise
ratio (TNR). Starting from the TNR, one can choose optimal values of the guard angle and the
number of quantisation sectors, in order to achieve the maximum number of extractable bits through605
phase-shift-keying (PSK) demodulation.
One of the firsts attempts to exploit frequency diversity was done in [43, 44] which started
from the consideration that channel fading is frequency selective and sub-channels independently
induct small, yet not negligible phase variations which could potentially generate significant and
unpredictable changes in the amplitudes of the resulting signals. The proposed algorithm extracts610
arrays of measurements from each frequency and calculates their averages which are then converted
in a multi-level quantisation. Disagreements are not addressed by error correcting code but instead,
they are reduced to a minimum with the choice of a set of tolerances based on the variance of
the measurements and a feedback from the previous generation attempt. The exploration of sub-
channels has the immediate consequence of multiplying the bit generation rate, which can be further615
improved by raising the number of quantisation levels with the aid of a more precise and costly
hardware. Inter-dependence between frequencies has been evaluated with a stochastic model that
showed how the bit extraction rate does not monotonically grow with the bandwidth and that a
larger channel spacing can be another way to improve the scheme’s efficiency.
Authors in [48], adjusted the number of channels and their inter-spacing in response to the620
user’s activity. Experiments showed that in high activity contexts the reduced coherence time is
best explored by sampling a limited number of channels with an adequate channel spacing. On
the other hand, low activity scenarios involve long stable communication paths, which allow the
harvesting of a greater number of channels.
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In [52] frequency diversity has been used in response to low key extraction efficiency of static and625
slow moving wireless environments. The scheme consists in a continuous changing of the frequency
during the channel probing phase, a technique referred to as frequency hopping, to capture the
channel frequency response and increase the available randomness. Moreover, channel estimates are
initially filtered to remove sharp changes of amplitude due to noises and subsequently converted into
a standard double-threshold quantisation. Investigated pre-processing methods include a moving630
average and a more sophisticated principal component analysis (PCA) based on the diagonalisation
of the co-variance matrix. During the tests, the protocol achieves a near zero disagreement rate and
a higher key generation efficiency compared to work in [23], which emphasises the superior ability
of transforming raw-data in key bits. Nonetheless, the empirical process used to identify the system
parameters considered only three frequency steps without taking into account the relationship with635
the dynamic characteristics of the channel.
The contribution of principal component analysis is also investigated in [53] where theory and
Monte Carlo simulations agreed on considering PCA a better pre-processing method than discrete
cosine transform (DCT) and wavelet transform (WT), regarding its ability to achieve a higher
generation rate. Authors also extended their previous work [50] by contrasting two versions of PCA640
based on private and common eigenvectors. The need to publicly transmit eigenvalues stems from
the consideration that even small discrepancies between the legitimate nodes result in significantly
different eigenvectors which in turns, lead to an uncorrelated reconstruction of the signal. Moreover,
the process of eigenvalue decomposition is computationally expensive and it could be advantageous
to have only one side to perform these calculations. Even considering the number of bits wiped645
out during the privacy amplification step to balance the information leakage, PCA with common
eigenvector gives better results than its private version. However, its complexity requires at least
one side with relevant computational capabilities, hence it does not seem to be appropriated in
low-end sensor networks.
An interesting property of orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) systems is their650
ability to minimise frequencies’ interference by construction, where the signal is divided in parallel
streams which are independently modulated in separated sub-carriers. The latter can be thought
of as a set of narrowband channels usable as multiple sources of randomness, therefore, further
increasing the key generation rate. This approach has been explored in [49] where the hardware
and electrical differences generated, greatly influence the channel state information rendering it655
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significantly non-reciprocal even in the same coherence time interval. To address this unexpected
obstacle, a new algorithm, called Channel Gain Complement (CGC), mitigates such a discrep-
ancy after an initial learning phase. Empirical tests showed how CSI non-reciprocity depends on
both noise, which is statistically independent and identically distributed, as well as a more stable
component associated to each sub-carrier.660
According to this consideration, after a small number of initial probes noise influence becomes
less and less critical, permitting the estimate of the stable component to be later removed to achieve
a lower bit mismatch. A multi-level quantisation step is executed in the domain frequency which
separately quantises each amplitude associated to a different sub-carrier of the OFDM system. Fur-
thermore, quantisation levels are dynamic and chosen depending on the variance of the reciprocity665
differentials acquired during the learning phase. The scheme seems to suffer in indoor environments
where the high dynamic multipath phenomena induce a sharp increase in error probability. On the
other hand, channel impulse responses have proven to be resilient to channel predictability attacks,
because the sub-carriers CIR trends are very different, i.e. not being correlated to the specific
line-of-sight situation as in any RSS-based approaches.670
3.3. CIR based methods
RSSI is an essential characteristic of the channel, widely available which fails to explore the
channel diversity and multipath behaviour. On the other hand, channel impulse response (CIR)
gives more detailed information about the channel state through a collection of distinct multipath
components, which compose a train of discrete pulses with different magnitudes and delays, indi-675
vidually modelled through Rician or Rayleigh fading. This finer-grained description of the channel
can further be converted into secret key bits. In [54] key extraction from jointly Gaussian random
variables was investigated, dragged by the fact that wireless channel taps possess a complex Gaus-
sian distribution [80]. The secret key capacity was defined as a function of SNR and simulations
were performed on two distinct quantisation schemes, based on equally likely levels and a minimum680
mean square error technique (MMSE). Results showed that even if the MMSE quantisation leads to
a lower BER, its output requires an entropy compensation algorithm which at the end, generates as
many bits as the equiprobable quantisation scheme. In contrast, the evaluation of both Gray and
natural codes in an LDPC-driven error reconciliation confirms the significantly higher performance
of the former.685
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An extension of the previous protocol was successfully applied in International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU) cellular channels [55]. Instead of taking only one sample per CIR observation,
scientists improved the protocol to sample each path. The main challenge was to remove the sta-
tistical dependence among Alice and Bob’s CIR samples while keeping the high correlation with
the other communicating party. Independent samples cannot be obtained by standard compres-690
sion techniques as they amplify the small differences at their input, producing bit-streams that
hardly match. However, an orthogonal greedy algorithm (OGA) has been introduced to repeti-
tively decompose the channel in taps, converted through quantisation and error correcting codes as
in the original scheme [54]. Despite the lack of practical tests, the simulations pointed out that the
extension shares the same performance curve as in the inspiring method.695
In the previous scheme, nodes’ mobility is the primary source of randomness, however, this role
can also be occupied by location-based information. In [56], both parties extract the shared key by
applying a previously agreed function on CIR measurements acquired at previous locations. The
function is used to increase the secret space, as in the case of permuting individual measurements,
quantised in a novelty scheme, called Jigsaw Encoding, to overcome the inability of uniform quan-700
tisation to keep a low BMR while increasing the number of the levels. In fact, uniform quantisation
is unable to emphasise how close the corresponding outputs have been, while due to high correla-
tion, in a PLS protocol a mismatch usually involves two consecutive bins. Using two matrices of
random numbers, Jigsaw Encoding translates quantisation outputs into vectors of numbers which
differ in few slots quickly recovered by a polynomial correcting code, providing a bit generation705
of 3-5 bits for each estimate and sufficient entropy. The security of the algorithm is based on the
assumption that only Alice and Bob are capable of getting accurate and correlated estimates and
that the adversary does not exactly know all the positions involved in the key generation phase,
especially when the number of considered locations is sufficiently large. An interesting observation
is that location-based CIR uniqueness and channel variations due to movements could be used on710
a mutual basis to strengthen existing algorithms.
Similarly to RSS-based approaches, CIR-based techniques benefit from their application in
MIMO systems. In [108], the theoretical limits of secret key extraction in MIMO systems have
been established, followed by a pilot experiment in [57] that confirmed the possibility of achieving a
high key generation rate (about 60 bits/estimate for a four-antenna array). Two practical quantisa-715
tion algorithms have been proposed as a better replacement of direct channel quantisation. The first
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one, called Channel Quantisation with Guardband (CQG), is a generalisation of the standard cen-
sor protocol [22] where both amplitude and phase are quantised in equally probable guard-banded
levels which are iteratively constructed as in [109]. In the second technique, referred to as Channel
Quantisation Alternating (CQA), guard-bands are replaced with two alternative quantisation maps720
that suggest to Bob which side of the complex channel sectors he should consider. Monte Carlo
simulations showed that CQA performs better with the increase of the number of quantisation levels
where CQG struggles to maintain a low BMR.
Mathematical expressions of BER and key generations efficiency of CQG were defined in [110],
where an information reconciliation step built on Slepian-Wolf lossless compression coding was also725
introduced. Simulations proved that maximum efficiency could be achieved by an adequate choice
of guard band regions and LDPC codes. Such parameters were later formally derived in [47].
Nevertheless, authors claimed that the use of guard interval is a suboptimal solution regarding key
generation rate because of the drop of channel taps whose phases lay under an invalid region. In
their successive work [58] they introduced an intelligent algorithm based on phase shifting toward730
some constellation points without any loss of secrecy, to transform the reconciliation problem into
a normal demodulation task. The proposed algorithm can extract 120 secret bits from a single
channel observation, however, it is based on impractical assumptions on channel estimation, as
well as reciprocity, further analysed in [59]. In [59], an efficient 3-way extraction procedure was
introduced to make the scheme less susceptible to channel variations. Furthermore, the role of735
mobility was investigated and simulations confirmed that it is in fact an advantage, as it allows a
faster temporal decorrelation of the channel and a faster key refresh. A precise formalisation of the
advantageous role of mobility remains to be researched.
The vast majority of cases relies on scalar quantisation where each channel estimate is separately
converted. In [63] authors claim that vector quantisation is needed to fully exploit the correlation740
among channel samples and to efficiently resolve the cell-boundary problem which coincides with
the high probability of disagreement of estimates falling close to quantisation bins’ boundaries. The
proposed scheme arises from the generalisation of CQG and CQA approaches, in which Alice and
Bob choose a quantisation variant in order to minimise the BMR. Furthermore, instead of generat-
ing a number of different variants, which would require significant computational complexity and745
memory footprint, the scheme introduce a rotation-base vector quantiser where rotation matrices
move channel vectors away from boundaries. The main drawback of vector quantisation is its strong
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connection with the level of uncertainty from the adversary point of view: if Eve’s observations are
correlated to the ones of Alice or Bob, the key will be more easily guessed. For this reason the
scheme also proposes the use of clustered key mapping which consists in an increased number of750
quantisation cells that enhances the overall robustness at the expense of worse BMR.
In reference [60] BGR is increased by generating bits from sub-carriers’ CIRs, modelled as
wide sense stationary uncorrelated scattering random processes. Quantisation is based on the
cumulative distribution function to approximately have the same amount of 0s and 1s, extracted
from subcarriers’ channel impulse responses. In their work [61, 62], authors improved the scheme by755
designing a low pass filter which aims to reduce the effects of noise and, moreover, they introduced
a rigorous modelling and analysis of the auto-correlation functions in both time and frequency
domains. In contrast to other schemes in the literature, the filter is not empirically determined
but arises from a mathematical modelling of channel reciprocity, resulting in a reduction of the
disagreement rate in all simulations.760
3.4. Miscellaneous approaches
Besides the previously proposed channel characteristics, there some schemes which explore the
domain from a different perspective and exploit different properties of the wireless medium. In
[16] the fluctuation of BER is considered a promising source of randomness since it embraces all
variabilities related to amplitude, phase, multipath delays, etc. Furthermore, a protocol is proposed765
to calculate BER in a hypothetical OFDM system as the average value of all sub-carriers and
then quantise it using the median value as the threshold. Unfortunately, the key agreement rate
is susceptible to low SNR and high fading frequencies. Moreover, existing low BERs (less than
10−3) represent insufficient sources of randomness and hence need to be amplified with artificial
distortions, a fact that limits further the protocol’s possible application scenarios.770
Most of the work in physical layer security is about the transmission of data and its additional
non-reciprocity compensation. On the contrary, in [17] researchers introduced a reverse pilot proto-
col in which the receiver transmits pilot signals so as the transmitter can use the channel estimation
to compensate and encode the transmission, thus obtaining an automatic symbol level encryption
at the channel level very similar to a shift decipher. The security of this protocol is based on the775
assumption that an attacker has no ways to correctly estimate the channel because the transmitter
does not send any reference signals. However, the feasibility and the strength of this study should
38
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
be further researched.
Similarly, in [66] scientists aim to manipulate the OFDM pilot tones to lower the quality of
eavesdropper’s estimates without the introduction of any artificial noise. In the first stage, the780
receiver broadcasts pilot symbols to the transmitter that has an equal chance to either manipulate
them or not. Phases’ manipulations are done according to a zero threshold which follows from their
uniform distribution, whereas amplitude’s threshold is more complex and empirically set. Simula-
tions show that both manipulations are indeed able to increase Eve’s BER, however, manipulations
also increase the legitimate parties’ BER, especially when applying phases’ manipulation.785
The frequency-selective channels in OFDM systems has been indirectly used to enhance the sig-
nal space diversity (SSD), which consists in the separated transmission of quadrature components
through independent fading channels. In [68], the interleaving pattern of the quadrature compo-
nents is adaptively established in the frequency domain of sub-carriers, which usually demonstrate
uncorrelated channel behaviours. Unfortunately, it is not clear how the obtained gain in secrecy790
capacity translates in a faster bit generation rate. In [71], the beam-forming abilities of an electron-
ically steerable parasitic array radiator (ESPAR) antenna are used to create artificial randomness
of channel measurements. In the proposed scheme, Alice and Bob generate arrays of estimates
larger than the desired key length, as a tolerance needed to address bit disagreements. These ad-
ditional values are then removed by both parties around the median value, which is used as the795
single threshold in the quantisation stage. Despite the initial waste of values, the single threshold
permits the extraction of one bit for each estimate, achieving a high bit generation rate, followed by
information reconciliation and privacy amplification steps based on Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem
(BCH) codes and unidirectional hash functions, respectively. Performances have been evaluated
in underwater environments where the beam-forming pre-processing has proved to strike a better800
balance with a sufficient key generation rate at a significantly lower bit mismatch rate than the
competitors [73].
The previous protocol has been extended with the application of an RSS-interleaving technique
which randomises and strengthens the keys, achieving a very high probability (99.9998%) of the
success of exchanging 128 bit keys every two seconds. Furthermore, in [72], the rank of RSSI profiles805
is calculated by sorting the estimates, which are later quantised in a multi-level quantisation step
with equi-probable bins. The main drawback in these approaches is the need of special antennas
solely applicable to very specific and expensive scenarios.
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Another beam-forming-based technique is introduced in [74] for securing multiple input single
output (MISO) systems, where the knowledge of legitimate users’ channel state information permits810
the annihilation of inter-user interferences. On the contrary, CSI of the passive eavesdropper is not
available at the transmitter. The scheme generates a specific code-book starting from the feedback
of a set of registered users, chosen by semi orthogonal selection in the attempt to exclude the ones
with poor channel conditions. Besides the negative effects on the main channel capacity, simulations
show that interferences may also be used to disrupt eavesdropper communication, acting as zero-815
powered artificial noise and thus increasing the secrecy capacity.
The use of artificial noise in MIMO systems is investigated in [69]. Authors state that a minimum
secrecy capacity could be guarantee if number of transmitting antennas is higher than ones available
to the adversary. Moreover, the presence of amplifying nodes is an alternative to a multi-antennas
equipped transmitter. The major drawback consists in the loss of power sacrificed by the transmitter820
in its attempt to disrupt the eavesdropper channel capacity. Beam-forming techniques and artificial
noise-based schemes are not mutually exclusive, hence they may be used together as in reference [70].
In the proposed protocol, the directional modulation is based on the recently developed random
frequency diverse array (RFDA) which maximises SNR in the legitimate direction, by means of
both angle and range. A lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity is used to determine the825
amount of transmitting power which should be destined to artificial noise, spread in all direction
to limit the eavesdropper effectiveness.
Another power-expensive technique is introduced in [19] where a jamming technique, namely
iJam, renders the scheme independent from channel variations, thus performing well even in static
scenarios. The receiver jams copies of the transmitted message in a random and alternate fashion,830
preventing an eavesdropper to listen to the clean signal. However, the latter can be reconstructed
by the receiver as he exactly knows which parts have been modified and where they are untouched.
Tests showed that iJam is actually able to generate keys faster (3-18 kb/s) than conventional schemes
with a negligible disagreement rate. This technique is built on previous studies on cooperative
jamming [111] but it does not require an out-of-band channel to inform the receiver about the835
jamming signal.
Traditional half-duplex (HD) systems are not able to simultaneously sense the channel because
the outgoing transmission generates a self-interference (SI) which is dominant in short distances,
highly disturbing the perception of the desired signal. However, in recent times many suppression
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techniques have been developed to minimise these phenomena leaving only some residuals (RSI)840
hence, allowing the growth of full-duplex (FD) wireless communication. In [75], full-duplex nodes
simultaneously act as both receivers and jammers, to degrade the eavesdropper channel while
receiving transmitted signals. Simulations confirmed that the proposed scheme achieves significant
performance increments in contrast to the half-duplex case [19], with receivers equipped with both
single and multiple antennas.845
In [67], the authors evaluate the key generation capabilities of in-band full-duplex wireless devices
(IBFD) by modelling those residuals as a zero mean Gaussian random variable whose variance is
proportional to the emitted power. The study compares and contrasts the performance of both
traditional and full-duplex systems showing that the latter permits a higher key rate especially
when considering a low correlation coefficient where half-duplex approaches result in an unfeasible850
BER. Authors affirm that FD devices can sense highly volatile channel states, thus exploiting an
additional amount of randomness which in turn, limits the key rate only to the performance of the
SI-suppression circuitry.
4. Conclusion
The quantisation step is the core of the key generation process and its performance depends on855
both quantisation parameters (i.e. striking a balance between the number of thresholds and noise
influence) as well as on the choice of the corresponding physical source of randomness. This survey
aims to identify the most popular channel characteristics and corresponding quantisation schemes
used to extract secret keys at the wireless physical layer in a comprehensive in depth state-of-play
critical literature review of various approaches published to date. To evaluate the performance and860
robustness of each approach the fundamental and contrasting characteristics of BGR, BMR and
Entropy were used as the key performance metrics throughout the discussion.
RSS based protocols could be easily implemented on current devices, requiring low hardware
and computational complexity, which encourages their use in real-world scenarios. Nonetheless, a
limitation of these protocols lies in the connection between the obtained entropy and the mobility of865
the nodes as well as the objects between them, exposing potential vulnerabilities against imminent
and active attacks. On the other hand, phase-based approaches do not suffer this weakness because
frequency-phase information is not related to distance and moreover achieve high entropy even by
extracting estimates at a rate not constrained by the channel coherence time. Furthermore, phase
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estimation is non-trivial since it requires some synchronisation which may not be real in concrete870
implementations between participants. To further boost the key generation rate, both the multipath
and frequency diversities of the wireless medium are further explored through the channel impulse
response CIR, responsible for extracting fine-grained information about the channel state. Similarly
to phase-based protocols, CIR-based schemes are also resilient to possible adversary attacks because
multipath trends are not correlated to line-of-sight (LOS) components, thus not easily predictable.875
In the majority of the schemes, imperfect reciprocity is passively accepted and its errors are ad-
dressed in the information reconciliation step. Nonetheless, only a few preventive and compensation
techniques have been applied to date, as in the interpolation with cubic Farrow filters [25, 31] or in
techniques using low-pass filters [21, 49, 61, 112]. This aspect has not been sufficiently elaborated in
the current research even if could potentially reduce the diminishing returns caused by information880
reconciliation.
The present review pinpoints and elicits that further work is required, which will build on
existing theory and make full use of the increased amount of channel information in specific time-
intervals and environmental conditions, while simultaneously shielding key entropy and robustness
in contexts exhibiting a slowly degenerating changing state. In addition, to the best of our knowl-885
edge, the implications derived from the applications of the existing secret-key extraction schemes
into specific real-life scenarios, as in the case of VANETs and WSNs, are insufficiently researched.
These networks, however, possess particular challenging characteristics which could possibly induce
either positive or negative effects that may in turn affect the performance of the extraction pro-
cesses, especially during the distillation stage. Moreover, new and updated criteria and guidelines890
need to be introduced in the choice of optimal quantisation thresholds and global parameters, with
a view to further improve existing and damaging trade-offs.
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